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Illusions of empowerment? Questioning policy and practice of community
forestry in Kenya
Susan W. Chomba 1,2, Iben Nathan 1, Peter A. Minang 2,3 and Fergus Sinclair 3,4
ABSTRACT. The extent to which community forestry (CF) contributes to empowerment of local communities remains hotly contested.
We develop a unified theory of empowerment at the intersection of asset-based agency and institution-based opportunity and apply
it to examine the extent to which the implementation of CF has led to local empowerment. Our empirical data are drawn from review
of national level policies and a field study of Ngare Ndare Community Forest Association (CFA) in Kenya. We investigated what types
of powers were transferred to the local level, how representative the local institution was of the local community, and how its formation
and composition affected the empowerment of socially and economically differentiated groups, with competing claims over the forest
resource. We found that national forest policies and actors transferred minimal powers that enabled local communities to execute forest
protection and conservation roles, while maintaining legislative powers and control of economic benefits centrally; and, that
representation within the CFA was highly skewed in favor of small and already powerful local elites. We discuss the findings in the light
of the literature on empowerment to develop insights about how to more effectively manage processes to empower local communities
through appropriately representative institutions.
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INTRODUCTION
Governments own and manage more than 80% of the world’s
forests (FAO 2010) but a trend toward community-based forest
management (CBFM) has gained momentum over the past 30
years (Agrawal et al. 2008, FAO 2010). Local communities and
forest-user groups now govern an estimated 200 million ha of
forests (Sandbrook et al. 2010). A key objective of CBFM is to
devolve power in forest management from central levels of
governments to local communities, thereby empowering
communities to make decisions about the resources that are
important for their livelihood (Kellert et al. 2000, Blaikie 2006).
The basic principles of CBFM include public participation and
democratic decision-making processes (Borrini-Feyerabend et al.
2004). These principles reflect global conventions on the
environment and human rights such as the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development; the Statement of Forest
Principles, and Agenda 21, that couple poverty reduction with
sustainable natural resource management (UN 1992); the Aarhus
Convention, which established rights of access to information,
public participation in decision making, and access to
environmental justice (UNECE 1998); the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs), and in particular goal number
seven on ensuring environmental sustainability (UN 2000); and
the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People with its
emphasis on Free, Prior and Informed Consent (UN 2007). Taken
together, these global declarations call for public participation
and democratic decision making as prerequisites for effective
environmental governance and sustainable development in the
context of their contribution to universal human rights.  
In the last few decades, natural resource governance has, both in
theory and practice, witnessed a surge toward these global ideals
of democracy and local enfranchisement (White and Martin
2002, Sandbrook et al. 2010). This paradigm shift has been
associated with three main developments: (i) mounting evidence
that traditional practices of managing natural resources do not
necessarily lead to the “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin 1968)
but can achieve positive outcomes for biodiversity conservation,
ecosystem resilience, and improvement of rural livelihoods
(Ostrom 1990); (ii) the realization that hierarchical, single agency,
top down management systems are not very effective at curbing
deforestation (White and Martin 2002, Berkes 2009); (iii) desire
to exercise justice, especially after recognizing that exclusion of
indigenous people and other members of local communities from
forest management discriminates against their traditional and
globally recognized human rights (Brosius et al. 1998, Larson
2005).  
Although the rationale for CBFM appears compelling, many
scholars have observed that its practical implementation often
falls short of achieving the intended goals, particularly in terms
of local empowerment. Various reasons have been suggested for
this. First, it has become increasingly evident that reconciling
multiple objectives of conservation, livelihoods, and governance
can be daunting. As such, many cases of CBFM end up attaining,
for instance, conservation goals at the expense of local
empowerment (Kellert et al. 2000). The implication is that the
three goals are not necessarily mutually reinforcing (Ribot et al.
2010). Second, a “community” comprises a complex set of actors,
with different social, economic, and political characteristics such
as wealth, gender, age, ethnicity, and castes (Agrawal and Gibson
1999). These actors have different access to resources and power,
as well as different interests in, and claims over, various
environmental goods and services (Leach et al. 1999, Nygren
2000; Chomba et al., in press). A key question then arises around
which of these actors are actually empowered when resources and
decision-making powers are transferred to local institutions?
Third, the implementation of CBFM usually involves a plethora
of institutions at various levels who may all claim to represent the
interests of local communities. These include local user groups,
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associations, government line ministries and representatives, civil
society organizations, and other fluid forms of collective action.
It is increasingly being realized that institutional arrangements
most likely to deliver on CBFM goals are quite complex, not least
because each of these institutional forms have their strengths and
weaknesses in addressing the needs of the local people (Ribot
2004; Chomba et al., in press). Current debates on CBFM center
on crucial questions of who should be empowered and how should
they be empowered. What is the nature of powers that should be
shared or transferred and which institutions can be considered
representative of the diverse interests that pertain in any particular
context?
The history of CBFM in Kenya
Debates around CBFM are a hot topic in Kenya because they
resonate with a national process of devolution under the
Constitution of 2010. The Government of Kenya formally
introduced CBFM in 2005 through the Forest Act (GoK 2005).
This Act provides for communities to participate in CBFM
through the formation of community forest associations (CFAs).
Article 46(1) states: “A member of a forest community may,
together with other members or persons resident in the area,
register a community forest association under the Societies Act...
an association registered under subsection (1) may apply to the
Director (of Kenya Forestry Service-KFS) for permission to
participate in the conservation and management” (GoK 2005:38).
CFAs are required to formulate forest management plans and sign
management agreements with KFS as preconditions for
participating in CBFM. By the year 2012, over 300 CFAs had
been registered across the country and numerous others were in
the process of registration (Mogoi et al. 2012). KFS also reported
a rapid increase in signing management agreements with CFAs
across the country by December 2014, where a total of 68
agreements had been signed (Standard Media 2015).  
The Forest Act has been heralded as a radical shift away from
former forest policies that were characterized by fierce state
control and exclusion of local communities (World Bank 2007).
This was largely because, prior to the introduction of CBFM,
forest management in Kenya, particularly in gazetted[1] forests,
was founded on colonial antecedents of reservation and
protection aimed at supplying wood for the colony (Thenya et al.
2008, Mugo et al. 2010). Designation of forest reserves, which
occurred mostly in the colonial era (1895-1963), often involved
displacement of local communities and/or their exclusion from
access and usufruct rights to land and forests (Standing and
Gachanja 2014; S. Chomba, J. Kariuki, J. F. Lund, and F. Sinclair,
unpublished manuscript). Postcolonial governments continued
these policies of exclusion, and deliberately used them to further
their own political and economic gains (Thenya et al. 2008,
Standing and Gachanja 2014).  
In particular, the Moi era was characterized by appointment of
political cronies to head the Forest Department, corruption, and
plundering of forests, which resulted in great forest loss (Mugo
et al. 2010, Njeru 2010). At this time, the Forest Department
presided over double standards where logging concessions were
awarded to large saw millers, owned by political elites, while small
saw millers were banned (Standing and Gachanja 2014).
Ironically, these large-scale excisions occurred at the time when
the government was exercising strict restrictions of forest access
by the rural poor. For instance, the shamba/taungya system, which
had been established in the 1960s to enable poor farmers to
contribute to the establishment of forest plantations, while at the
same time benefiting from farming amongst the young trees was
discontinued under a departmental instruction in 1988 (Mogaka
et al. 2001, as cited in Mugo et al. 2010). However, when it was in
the interest of political elites, particularly during political
elections, forests were used as patronage, awarded to squatters or
fellow members of the elite in exchange for their political support
(Klopp 2012, Standing and Gachanja 2014). Other forests were
subject to World Bank and state sanctioned conversions under the
infamous “Nyayo tea zones”[2] (Klopp 2012, Njeru 2013).  
Pressure from civil societies and donors, bolstered by the global
conventions mentioned above, prompted the radical shift in
government rhetoric from state-centric to people-centric forms of
forest management (Thenya et al. 2008). In 1991, the government
launched the Kenya Forest Master Plan, which was a 25-year plan
that embraced principles of sustainable forest management, and
encouraged community participation on a trial basis. CBFM, also
known as Participatory Forest Management (PFM) in Kenya, was
then legally underpinned in the Forest Act, which was passed in
2005 and gazetted on 9 February 2007. The Forest Act also
required the transformation of the Forest Department into the
Kenya Forest Service (KFS), a semiautonomous agency with
greater legislative and fiscal powers.  
The Forest Act vested the role of empowerment of CFAs on KFS.
Article 4(M) of the Forest Act states the function of KFS shall
include “promoting the empowerment of associations and
communities in the control and management of forests” (GoK
2005:11). Some of the key legislations enacted by KFS in
conjunction with the then Ministry of Environment and Natural
Resources (MENR) to facilitate community participation and
empowerment were the PFM Rules and the PFM Guidelines
(MENR 2007a,b). On representation, the PFM guidelines state
that interested members of the community living adjacent to the
forest must form CFAs; and that CFA leadership must be selected
through a fair electoral process. The CFA leadership must also
represent forest users and other stakeholders, as well as take into
consideration gender and marginalized groups (MENR 2007a,b)  
The Forest Act and its supporting legislation have now been
functioning for some time (since 2007), and it is imperative to take
stock of whether they meet their objectives of empowerment, i.e.,
have the administrative and policy reforms that have been enacted
translated into any meaningful changes on the ground? Against
this background, the aims of the present research are twofold: (i)
to examine empowerment and representation under CBFM in the
particular context of Kenya; (ii) to provide local lessons to inform
national and global policies and current scholarly debates on
CBFM. It does so first by developing a theoretical framework on
empowerment and representation. It then uses the framework to
interrogate two research questions: (i) What is the nature of powers
that have actually been transferred to the CFAs in Kenya? (ii) To
what extent can the CFAs be considered representative of the
communities and what are the implications for community
empowerment?
Theory of empowerment
There are variations in meaning and assessments of the concept
of empowerment. On the one hand, empowerment indicates the
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ability of an individual or group to exercise agency, choice, self-
determination, entitlement to make decisions, freedom, control,
and ownership of their lives (Rowlands 1997, Alkire 2005). On
the other hand, empowerment is perceived as making institutions,
state and nonstate, more responsive and accountable to poor
people (Ribot 2004, Narayan 2005). Thus the conceptualization
of empowerment can be distinguished under two main schools
of thought: one based on peoples’ agency, choice, and the ability
to control their own lives; and the second based on political and
economic notions of making institutions more responsive to local
people (Ibrahim and Alkire 2007). Here, we unite these two
schools of thought by regarding empowerment as the intersection
of “asset-based agency” with “institution-based opportunity
structures” (Fig. 1). Clearly, asset-based agency will be important
for institutional-based opportunity structures to function (Alsop
et al. 2006, Ibrahim and Alkire 2007), because empowerment
involves expanding assets and capabilities of poor people so that
they can deliberate within institutions, that is, participate,
negotiate, persuade, and hold institutions accountable (Narayan
2005).
Fig. 1. Empowerment as the intersection of asset-based agency
and institution-based opportunity with transformative
processes of democracy and transfer of powers, respectively.
Agency is ultimately an attribute of individuals but tends to be
applied to groups. Multiple, overlapping ways of grouping
individuals may apply (hexagon labels are illustrative) and may
be relevant to understanding how inclusive representation is of
socially differentiated groups of actors, both descriptively and
substantively. Democracy is seen as a critical means of
achieving representation.
Scholars analyzing decentralized forest management have built
on institutionalism to suggest that empowerment can result from
transfer of various types of powers from higher to lower levels of
governance in political and administrative hierarchies (Larson
2005, Nygren 2005). Agrawal and Ribot (1999) and Agrawal and
Gibson (1999) classify powers transferred through CBFM into
three categories: legislative, executive, and judicial. These are, in
turn, translated into three empirically examinable categories: (i)
the power to create rules about the use of the resource, (ii) the
power to implement rules, and (iii) the power to adjudicate
disputes. This framework covers the three institutional
mechanisms of power transfer, which we have found suitable for
examining policy provisions and the practice of CBFM, especially
when they are not necessary driven by local demands, and instead
largely driven by external agents such as civil societies and donors
and implemented through formal policy changes such as forest
law.  
The nature of institutions and actors are deemed fundamental
for representation to occur with democracy identified as the key
mechanism to ensure it. This suggests that the actors to whom
power is transferred should be democratically elected (Ribot 2004,
Larson 2005). Democratically elected actors are seen to carry the
mandate of wider populations (Larson 2005); elections are seen
as the mechanism for sanctioning leaders both positively, through
election and re-election, and negatively, through nonelection,
thereby providing a mechanism for local citizens to hold their
leaders accountable (Larson 2005). Representation is also
interpreted in both descriptive and substantive forms, where
descriptive form refers to the number of members of a particular
group elected, whereas substantive form refers to the
representation of specific interests of that group (Wängnerud
2009, Bandiaky-Badji 2011). This distinction is important
because it is possible for members of a group to be elected but
not represent the interests of that group. For example, women
elected to male dominated institutions may not necessarily
represent women’s interests; they may even conform to a male
stereotype. Deficiencies in representation may be a mechanism
through which some actors are disenfranchised. On the other
hand, it could be positive for people whose asset-based agency is
low, such as the poor, low castes, and other marginalized groups
who may be empowered through deliberative processes within
institutions to promote their interests.  
Therefore, in addressing questions about CBFM and its effects
on empowerment it is necessary to look into (1) whether there is
a genuine transfer of powers from one level of government to
another, (2) whether power is transferred to local institutions that
are representative, which is understood as being responsive to the
needs of different segments of the local community, but also (3)
whether this transfer will actually lead to reconciliation of
multiple, and sometimes conflicting, interests of socially and
economically differentiated actors (Nygren 2005).
METHODS
Ngare Ndare Community Forestry Association/Trust
Ngare Ndare forest covers an area of 5500 ha (55 km²) across an
interface of humid and dry ecosystems in Meru and Laikipia
Counties in north-central Kenya. It is a public forest, gazetted in
1932 by the colonial government. It is managed by the KFS in
conjunction with the local CFA/Trust. Ngare Ndare CFA started
as a working group in the year 2000. A working group is a legally
recognized institution that operates as a forum for stakeholders,
including individuals and organizations, on a matter of common
interest, in this case, forest management. The working group was
formally registered as a Trust in 2004. A trust is an institution
registered under the Law of Trusts, where people named as
Trustees manage property, in this case the forest, on behalf  of the
beneficiaries, in this case the local community (GoK 2012). When
the Forest Act was passed in 2005, it obliged communities and
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any pre-existing organizations to register as CFAs to apply to
KFS to comanage state forests. The Ngare Ndare Trust was
registered as a CFA in 2007, but the original Trust remained the
predominant local institution. The CFA and the Trust are
separate legal entities, but they actually operate as one and the
same institution in practice.  
The highest decision-making organ of the CFA/Trust is the board
of trustees, comprising nine members: one elected chairman from
each of the six village community-based organisations (CBOs),
two appointed representatives of the conservancies, and one
appointed representative of the medium and large-scale farms.
The local forester and the manager of the Trust were ex-officio
members of the board, which meant that they could provide
suggestions to the board, but had no voting rights.  
Ngare Ndare CFA/Trust forms a good case for studying
representation and empowerment. It has been in existence for a
while (since 2004 when the Trust was formed and 2007 when the
CFA was registered). It also fulfills the formal criteria set up by
the KFS as a precondition for engaging in CBFM. This includes
the preparation of a management plan, and signature of a
management agreement. At least in formal terms, the Ngare
Ndare CFA embodies a CFA as envisioned by the Forest Act.
Finally, the CFA is located in an area where the “local
community” comprises different groups with distinguishable
needs and interests in forest management.
Data collection methods
The primary data for this study was collected between September
and November 2012 and February and June 2013. The research
took place at two levels: a national level policy review and a local
level field research. The national level study included a critical
review of legal and policy documents including the Forest Act of
2005, Participatory Forest Management (PFM) guidelines, and
PFM rules. This was combined with 15 key informant interviews
involving actors from KFS, the Ministry of Environment, Water
and Natural Resources, and civil society organizations including
the Forest Action Network, Kenya Forests Working Group, and
National Alliance of Community Forest Associations
(NACOFA). The aim of the interviews was to gain a broad view
of the extent to which forest management had changed since the
introduction of CBFM; the requirements for community
participation within CBFM and the options and challenges faced
by CFAs; as well as how the legal provisions such as the Forest
Act and the subsidiary legislation influenced local empowerment
associated with CFAs. It was important to acquire insights at this
higher (national) level because the challenges and options
explained here, such as limitations of empowerment of CFAs by
legal provisions, helped in interpreting the findings of the
subsequent case study.  
The local level field research included a study of the six villages
and the four medium and large-scale farms in the jurisdiction of
the Ngare Ndare CFA. We aimed to collect data on the types of
powers devolved to the CFA and to examine representation within
the CFA. We therefore employed a combination of interviews,
focus group discussions (FGDs), and a semistructured survey to
collect data from the various groups of actors. We conducted a
total of 15 semistructured interviews with leaders of the studied
CFA, CBOs and user groups, and other community leaders
including chiefs. These respondents were purposively selected to
explain the local organization of the CFA: who was part of it and
how they came to be there, the rules of forest access, who formed
them and what power there was to enforce them, and the roles
and benefit sharing arrangements relating to the CFA and KFS.
We conducted six FGDs in each of the six villages to understand
the dynamics of representation, that is, how the villagers selected
their leaders, to what extent their interests with regard to forest
access (their roles and benefits), were represented within the CFA
and to what extent different actors were involved in making and
implementing various rules and solving resulting disputes.
Qualitative data were systematically analyzed following the
constant comparison method (Glaser and Strauss 2009). This
involved coding, achieved by creating broad categories from
interview and FGD responses and the content of policy
instruments, refining these categories into subthemes using more
concrete rules, and then building a grounded theory set out in the
results, that drew on the researchers’ first-hand experience with
the setting, informants, and documents.  
Finally, we conducted intra-household surveys in two villages.
The survey was administered to 120 randomly selected
households within the two villages, by applying a set of randomly
generated numbers to a list of households obtained from local
leaders. The survey aimed at providing key socioeconomic
characteristics of the households such as land ownership,
ethnicity and forest access. These data were processed using the
Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) and descriptive
statics used to quantify ownership and access amongst different
groups of respondents. It enabled us to generalize household
variables and triangulate responses with qualitative data collected
through interviews and FGDs; it was not aimed at drawing
statistical comparisons amongst villages.
Socioeconomic characterizations of the respondents
Ngare Ndare CFA covers six villages, two medium-scale farms,
one large-scale farm, and two large-scale conservancies
surrounding Ngare Ndare forest. Each of the six villages has a
registered community-based organization (CBO), which
represent the village at the CFA level. The CBOs in turn comprise
self-organized user groups that include: water, grazers,
beekeepers, firewood collectors, tree planters, and young people,
based on various access and usufruct rights. The six villages are
occupied by smallholder farmers generally with up to 2 ha,
medium-scale farms with 50-100 ha, and large-scale farms and
conservancies with more than 10 000 ha (Table 1).  
Land tenure differentiations (sizes and usage of land at household
level) largely structured the different groups who accessed the
forest and formed the CFA. Smallholder farmers in Ngare Ndare
were mainly ethnic Africans, who practiced agro-pastoralism.
They grew crops such as maize and vegetables for household
consumption and sold the surplus in the Timau and Nanyuki
urban centers. Some smallholder groups such as the Maasai,
Samburu, and Turkana tended to be more pastoralist-oriented;
they kept large numbers of livestock, whereas the Meru and
Kikuyu were more farming oriented with fewer livestock and
more of a focus on crop cultivation. These groups’ use of forest
was commensurate with their livelihood strategy, with the
majority of the Maasai indicating that they depended on the forest
for grazing rather than farming, whereas the Meru, Kikuyu, and
other farming groups indicated that they depended on the forest
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Table 1. Selected socioeconomic characteristics of respondents and their access to various forest products (Source: Survey data and
focus group discussions).
 
Land sizes Ethnicity Main forest products accessed and
interests
Smallholder farmers (n = 120) < 50 ha;
91% had 0-2 ha
Africans
Kikuyu (22 %),
Maasai (30 %)
Meru (34 %)
others (Turkana, Samburu, &
Borana; 14 %)
• Firewood
• Water for domestic use and
irrigation
• Grazing
Medium farm holders (2) 50-100 ha Europeans • Water for irrigation
Large scale farm holders (1) > 10,000 ha Europeans • Water for irrigation
Large scale conservancies (2) > 10,000 ha Europeans • Wildlife habitat conservation
• Eco-tourism
for irrigation water more than for grazing. Both groups depended
on the forest for firewood collection, construction wood,
gathering of medicinal plants, and beekeeping.  
People of European descent whose families settled there during
colonial times owned medium-scale farms, large-scale farms, and
conservancies. They practiced mechanized farming or wildlife
conservation and tourism. The farmers grew wheat, vegetables,
and flowers, mainly for export, while the conservationists
practiced high-end tourism mainly catering for international
visitors. The farmers used the forest mainly as a supply of water
for irrigation, while the conservancy owners relied on the forest
as a habitat connector between their private conservancies, public
forest nearby, and other ecosystems in the area, such as Mt.
Kenya.
FINDINGS
Transfer of powers
Using the framework outlined in Figure 1, we investigated transfer
of powers in three categories: (a) the power to make rules, (b) the
power to implement and enforce the rules, and (c) the power to
resolve disputes arising from implementation of the rules. From
the data we obtained, we further classified “rules” into four
categories: (i) forest conservation rules, which included
designating forest areas for conservation versus utilization and
tree planting; (ii) harvesting rules, which included those governing
grazing, firewood collection, beekeeping, water, and other forest
products and services; (iii) protection rules, which included
firefighting, guarding and control of illegal activities; and (iv)
benefit sharing rules. Although we discuss the first three
subcategories of rules (conservation, harvesting, and protection)
together, we separate them in our presentation below from the
benefit sharing rules because the latter were the main concern of
the management agreements signed between KFS and CFAs.
Power to make rules
There are no provisions for CFAs to make rules either in the Forest
Act, or in other subsidiary legislation. The Act vests these powers
on KFS and the Minister of Environment, Water and Natural
Resources. The Forest Act (4d) broadly states the functions of the
“service” as “formulating policies and guidelines regarding the
management, conservation and utilization of all types of forest
areas in the country”; while 59 (1&2) vests the power to make all
forest conservation, utilization, and protection rules on the
minister. According to the national level interview respondents
(Key Informant [KI] 4, 5, 6[3]), only state actors, including the
Ministry for Environment, Water and Natural Resources
(MEWNR) and KFS, had the power to make the rules. The
ministry made rules controlling timber harvesting, charcoal
burning, and grazing at the national level, which then determined
who could access these resources at the local level. The minister
also periodically issued and lifted nationwide bans on these
activities to control forest utilization. However, the same
respondents also indicated that these bans were often ineffective
in controlling the activities at a local level. For instance, charcoal
burning was legalized under new regulations in 2009 precisely
because previous bans had resulted in an escalation of charcoal
prices fuelling increased illegal production (KI 6).  
In Ngare Ndare, CFA leaders (Semistructured Interviews [SSI] 7,
8) indicated that all rules of access and determination of access
fees for forest products were crafted by KFS. Harvesting of forest
products was also indirectly controlled through the number of
licensed collectors by the local forester employed by KFS. Those
who could afford the fees could collect the products legally, while
those who could not afford fees could only collect them illegally.  
FGDs with smallholders revealed that the CFA could have
negotiated for some power to make basic rules before signing the
management agreement with KFS (FGD 1, 3, 5, 6). The rules
mentioned included making decisions on whether or not to charge
forest access fees under the management agreement. They
discussed how the management agreement provided an
opportunity to negotiate some of the legal powers held by the
state, and control over benefits to communities. They explained,
however, that these powers had not been transferred to the CFA
because some powerful groups (medium-scale and large-scale
farms and conservancy owners) were in favor of smallholders
being charged access fees and their access to the forest being
restricted to conserve the forest (FGD 1, 3, 5, 6).
Power to implement and enforce rules
The Forest Act vests the power to enforce forest rules on forest
officers, defined as “a forester, a disciplined officer of the service,
or an honorary forester” (GoK 2005:part V). The Forest Act
however allows CFAs to apply to participate in forest monitoring
and enforcement of forest protection rules (GoK 2005:article 45,
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e, iii). In Ngare Ndare, the CFAs enforced as well as implemented
the rules formulated by state authorities. For instance, FGDs
revealed that through the management agreement signed with
KFS, the CFA was obliged to control forest activities that would
lead to forest degradation, including forest fires, overgrazing, and
tree cutting. The CFA enforced these rules through the respective
user groups and rangers employed by the Trust, who arrested and/
or reported offenders to local leaders. The entire forest was policed
by a total of 17 rangers: three employed by KFS and 14 employed
by the Trust (FGD 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6). The big disparity in the number
of KFS versus Trust rangers is indicative of the major burden of
forest protection falling to the CFA/Trust. Rangers employed by
KFS mainly collected fees and issued permits for grazing and
firewood collection; while those employed by the Trust did not
collect any revenue, but were mainly conducting patrols to ensure
compliance with the rules and the arrest of offenders (SSI 1, 2).  
Almost 85% of our survey respondents indicated that illegal
activities such as charcoal burning and logging, as well as the
incidence of fire had greatly reduced since the Trust/CFA had
started enforcing the rules. This was attributed to the increased
monitoring by the rangers and internal monitoring by community
members, who would report each other to local leaders. User
groups also had internal self-regulatory rules. For instance, the
grazers user group carried out rotational grazing in designated
paddocks (grazing areas), reported ingression to the forest by
outsiders and monitored pasture regeneration to avoid
overgrazing. They also restricted grazing of goats in the forest
because their browsing was thought to cause forest degradation.
Some rules that the CFA was expected to implement, like
controlling excess use of water, were made difficult to enforce
because of competition for water within and amongst different
groups, which often required alternative dispute resolution (SS 2,
4). For instance, following water-related conflicts, the water-user
groups had commissioned a study to monitor how much water
smallholders, medium- and large-scale farms, and flower farms
nearby abstracted in the year 2012, to arrive at equitable water
distribution amounts and charges (SSI 15).
Power to resolve disputes
The PFM guidelines require any stakeholders, government,
NGOs, religious groups, or the private sector, working with CFAs
to train the CFAs in conflict management and negotiation skills.
However, neither the formal policies, nor the management
agreement, specifically mention the devolution of judicial roles,
or the sharing of responsibility between KFS and CFAs. As such,
it remains unclear how conflicts should be handled.  
In practice, FGDs revealed that the Trust/CFA in Ngare Ndare
had not received any formal training on conflict resolution, but
that it successfully handled disputes, such as those involving
grazing, and inclusion or exclusion of outsiders, particularly
during the dry season. Resolutions were made under the oversight
of the local KFS forester and other local leaders, such as village
chiefs. Minor offenders, such as women harvesting forest products
without licenses were arrested by the forest guards and presented
to the local forest office where they were either fined or given a
verbal warning by the forester. Major offenders, such as illegal
loggers, were arrested and taken to court, where they were
subjected to a more thorough judicial process. When disputes
amongst parties, such as conflicts over water access, could not be
resolved by the CFA because of vested interests of various actors
in the institution itself, other actors, including water users
associations, chiefs, and other relevant government authorities,
would become involved (SSI 4, 13, 15). FGDs also indicated that
disputes would be subject to court processes if  they escalated
beyond what could be handled through local dispute resolution
mechanisms.
Benefit sharing rules
The Forest Act and subsidiary legislation did not specify how
benefits would be shared between CFAs and KFS. In the absence
of national benefit sharing rules or a national framework, the
roles, benefits, and responsibilities of each actor were determined
by the management agreement, signed between the CFA and KFS
at the onset of CBFM (KI 1, 3, 4). In Ngare Ndare, the
management agreement entitled the CFA to benefits accruing
from eco-tourism, which included charging entry and camping
fees to local and international visitors to the forest (SSI 3, 6). KFS
on the other hand, took the revenue from grazing, firewood and
water access fees, as well as other licenses issued (FGD 1, 6; SSI
3, 6). The CFA revenue increased significantly over the three-year
[4] collection period to approximately US$6000 in 2010, $24,000
in 2011, and $38,000 in 2012, outstripping the revenue collected
by KFS (see Chomba et al., in press). In addition, the CFA was
required to remit an annual ecotourism concession fee of KSh
1.2 Million (approx. US$15,000) annually to KFS (SS1 2, 6). The
net revenue that the CFA/Trust collected from eco-tourism was
reinvested in paying for conservation activities, such as salaries of
guards to police forest access by smallholders (SSI 4, 15).  
Overall, KFS transferred the power to execute rules to the CFA,
but maintained the power to craft these rules. Dispute resolution
powers were not well defined but in practice distributed among
formal and informal structures at local level, with opportunities
for more formal legal redress if  they could not be solved locally.
KFS also maintained its revenue collection from local
communities in respect of their access to basic livelihood needs
such as grazing, firewood, and water, even though it was the
communities themselves who largely protected the forest through
internal policing and from ingress by external actors. The
combination of these rule-making powers by state authorities,
and the devolution of executing roles to the CFA, resulted in local
perceptions of only partial decentralization with control of forest
management still largely resting with the state. The head of an
NGO that had been prominent in spearheading community
forestry in Kenya stated emphatically the following:  
... there is no decentralized forest management in Kenya.
All decisions about government forests are made at the
KFS headquarters, including minor ones, like who should
be invited to a forest meeting; who should harvest a load
of firewood or graze their goats and cows, let us say, at
Mt. Elgon forest. (KI 9: 16.10.2012) 
The Trust/CFA was a critical institution where the exchange of
power and benefits were negotiated between state agencies and
local communities. The CFA was also composed of different
segments of the community.
How did the CFA represent the interests of various groups?
The intra-household surveys and interviews with local leaders
revealed two key dimensions of representation elaborated (cf. Fig.
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1): (i) descriptive representation in terms of the numbers of people
from different groups who were members of the Board of Trustees
(the decision-making organ of the CFA) and the modality for
choosing them; (ii) substantive representation, in terms of
responsiveness to competing needs and interests of different
groups.  
With regard to descriptive representation, the modality of
choosing members of the board of trustees was that each of the
six village CBOs elected their officers, chairmen, treasurers, and
secretaries, every 3-4 years. The six CBO chairmen and three
representatives of the medium-, large-scale farm, and
conservancies then formed the board of trustees (FGD 1, 2, 3, 4,
5, 6). The representatives of the medium- and large-scale farms
were the actual owners of the farms who appointed, or as they
termed it themselves, volunteered to assume these positions (SSI
14, 15). So, according the to the FGDs, although the local
communities could remove their own representatives at least every
3-4 years if  they did not address their needs, there was no
mechanism to remove the representatives of the medium- and
large-scale farms from their positions.  
The nine members of the board of trustees internally appointed
the chairman of the board (SSI 2, 14, 15). The present chairman,
one of the medium-scale farm owners, had held the post since the
formation of the trust in 2004 (SSI 2). The constitution of the
CFA, seen by the main author and collaborated by interview
respondents (SSI 2, 4), allowed him to hold office for a maximum
of two consecutive terms, each term running for four years.
Although his second term ended in 2012, he was still in office in
2013. No internal elections had been convened by the board,
which smallholders and other CBO chairmen considered an
indication of an attempt by the large-scale farmers to hold on to
power (FGD 1, 3, 4; SSI 2, 11).  
In numerical terms, the six CBO chairmen, if  united, could prevail
over board decisions via garnering a majority of votes (SSI 2, 10,
11). In practice, however, the agency of board members varied,
with the few wealthy medium- and large-scale farmers and
conservancy owners able to exert greater influence (SSI 2). The
CBO chairmen stated that by the virtue of being registered as the
legal trustees of Ngare Ndare Trust, as well as because of their
socioeconomic position related to their extensive property and
other endowments, the medium- and large-scale farmers and
conservancy owners were viewed by the community as both
powerful and benign to the point of not being challenged. This
was so even when they made unpopular decisions, such as
retaining their chairman in office, beyond the maximum term (SSI
2, 10, 11). One village leader summed up the situation as follows.  
Even though we are numerically more ... the Trust is
controlled by the large-scale farmers, because they
provide funding for it through donations and offer other
kinds of support ... they supply vehicles for ferrying other
members from the villages to the trust office during
meetings, advertise eco-tourism activities in the public
forest to high end visitors in their lodges, thereby
increasing the revenue of the trust, mobilize partnerships
with private corporations such as Safaricom, the British
Army [which has a large training facility nearby], and
others, to raise funds for conservation and the local
communities, and also support development activities in
the wider community such as mobile health clinics and
granting education bursaries for needy children. (SSI 13:
10.10.2012) 
The conservancy owners were also founders and sitting board
members in other regional conservation organizations such as the
Northern Rangeland Trust and Laikipia Wildlife Forum through
which they influenced conservation decisions in the larger
ecosystem (SSI 8, 14). Thus, they were regarded in the community
as powerful, and their decisions at the CFA board of trustees level
were rarely questioned (SSI 2, 10, 11). The dependence on large-
scale farmers and conservancies by the Trust/CFA and, by
extension, the wider community, was also explained by
smallholder farmers and their representatives, some of whom
stated they did not wish to upset their relationship (FGD 5; SSI
10).  
The board of trustees allocated the revenue collected from eco-
tourism, as well as other revenues such as donations from
corporations or well-wishers, to various kinds of expenditure (SSI
2, 8, 14). During the signing of the management agreement, the
Trust had promised the community that the revenue would be
shared on a 60 by 40 ratio to community development and the
running costs of the CFA, respectively (FGD 1, 2, 6). In practice,
the Board had overruled this and allocated most of the revenue
to the trust’s running costs, which included salaries for the 14
forest guards, a manager and accountant, and fueling and
maintenance of patrol vehicles (SSI 2, 8, 10). It was not until
March 2013, after the six CBO chairmen insisted that the villagers
needed to see some benefit from managing the forest, that the
board allocated modest sums (KSh 50,000, approximately
US$600) to each village for them to allocate to various projects
(FGD 1, 2, 3, 4, 6; SSI 2, 9, 10). As a result of this type of decision
making, local communities had come to perceive the Board of
Trustees as being under the control of the large-scale farmers and
conservancy owners, and to act in favor of conservation, as
opposed to livelihood enhancing activities (FGD 1, 2, 3, 4, 6)  
FGDs and household surveys revealed that smallholders mainly
accessed extractive forest products, such as fodder or grazing,
firewood, water for irrigation, and honey that were important for
their livelihoods. Although the smallholders indicated the need
to protect the forest for the supply of these products in future,
they perceived that KFS was interested in extracting fees,
supported by medium- and large-scale farmers, whose forest
needs were mainly conservation for wildlife, as well as a source of
water for irrigation.  
FGDs and interviews with CBO leaders further revealed how
these competing needs and interests compelled large-scale farmers
to support actions by KFS that were not in the interests of
smallholders. The smallholders, among other things, argued that
large-scale farmers were in favor of the agency charging them fees
for access to grazing, firewood collection and other resources from
the forest, even though the agency bore hardly any of the costs of
protecting the forest (FGD 1, 2, 6). Smallholders paid KSh 16
(US$0.19) per sheep per month and KSh 50 (US$0.59) per cow
per month for grazing. Firewood permits were issued at KSh 100
(US$1.18) per back or head load per month, while water access
was charged by KFS at the point of extraction if  this was inside
and the local water agency charged per unit of consumption at
the household level (FGD 1, 2, 6). The revenue from firewood
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and grazing was collected by the forester and was supposed to be
remitted to KFS headquarters, although various respondents
frequently mentioned cases of corruption (SSI 2, 10, 14).  
Some respondents indicated that the fees charged for access to
grazing and firewood collection were high and unnecessary,
particularly considering that the fees were collected by KFS and
were not used to benefit the local community (FGD 6; SSI 4, 10,
11). On the other hand, conservancy representatives had diverted
resources from an agreed 60 by 40 ratio to allocate revenue mainly
for forest protection. One CBO chairman noted as follows.  
...KFS has no real costs as the CFA has taken over the
role of forest protection. The CFA employs 14 guards
compared to the 3 guards employed by KFS. All the
revenue collected by the CFA from ecotourism was
previously spent on fueling the vehicle for patrols and
paying salaries for the guards. The wazungus [white
large-scale and medium-scale land owners) on the board
have championed the use of this money for forest
protection. It was not until last year that we [chairmen
of the six CBOs] managed to convince them that the
communities would soon be fed up of protecting the forest
without realizing any financial benefit. So they agreed
we allocate KSh 50,000 (approx. US$600) for each
village to carry out some developments... (SS1: 12.10.2012) 
In summary, the powerful medium- and large-scale farmers and
conservancy owners, appeared to have captured the CFA/Trust
and diverted it in favor of their interests, even in the presence of
six CBO chairmen elected by the majority of smallholders. On
the other hand, KFS extracted revenues through forest access fees
and ecotourism concession fees from the smallholders, while
delegating forest protection, conservation, and rule enforcement
through the CFA.
DISCUSSION
Implications of CBFM for community empowerment
Our findings show that overall, the introduction of the Kenyan
Forest Act of 2005 and implementation of CBFM in Kenya
signify a major shift away from state-centric forest management
that has prevailed over the last century. Policy documents,
including the Forest Act and other subsidiary legislation that we
examined contained clear statements that envisioned a goal of
local empowerment. The legislation required CFAs to be
representative of interested stakeholders, while taking into
consideration marginalized groups. However, the same laws and
policies retained the power to make and enforce rules with state
authorities, mainly KFS and the environment ministry, and their
local antennas. In practice, enforcement was largely delegated to
CFAs.  
Our examination of how the process of local empowerment
played out through implementation of CBFM in Kenya reveals
two major reasons why outcomes fall short of expectations. First,
local empowerment was undermined by institutional structures,
including policies and actions of state actors that limited transfer
of powers to CFAs. Second, pre-existing social and economic
inequality coupled with competition for environmental goods and
services amongst different groups at the local level prevented
marginalized groups from exercising sufficient agency to achieve
effective representation and influence in the CFAs. These two
constraints re-enforced each other. Thus, because of their lack of
agency, the marginalized groups could not influence the contents
of the management agreements between the CFA and KFS.
Instead of a transfer of power in favor of the marginalized groups,
the management agreement ended up not only serving, but
actually reinforcing the power of larger farmers and conservancy
owners.  
In terms of the institutionally generated opportunity structures,
we found that the powers transferred to CFAs were unbalanced,
in that power to execute rules was transferred without requisite
power to make or alter them (Agrawal and Gibson 1999, Agrawal
and Ribot 1999). The state agency retained the powers to make
rules regarding forest use, access, and distribution of revenue. In
practice the state had devolved responsibilities to implement rules
but not the discretionary powers to determine and change them,
or sufficient financial incentives to implement them. The power
to resolve disputes was distributed amongst a number of local
institutions and actors. The mix of powers that ideally should be
devolved under CBFM remains contentious but many authors
suggest that it should follow the principle of subsidiarity, that is,
that decisions are made at the lowest possible level without
compromising functionality at higher levels, while paying
attention to a balance between costs and benefits (Føllesdal 1998,
Ribot 2003). In the empirical case examined, the local and
national level institutions of the central state had retained rule-
making powers and economic benefits, preventing the
achievement of its stated goal of local empowerment.  
With respect to asset-based agency, wealthy local elites, whose
needs and interests in managing the forest did not match those of
the majority of poor smallholders and other marginalized groups,
took up appointed positions in leadership of the CFA board
(descriptive representation), to influence decisions that furthered
their own interests (substantive representation). This reveals a
form of elite capture through representation. Our findings further
reveal that the CFA could have negotiated for more decision-
making powers and control over economic benefits before signing
the management agreement with KFS, on the basis that self-
policing through the CFA released KFS from incurring significant
costs for forest protection. However, the prospect of negotiating
for greater powers was undermined by competing claims and
interests of the two key groups in the CFA/Trust, with those of
the more powerful group prevailing. The management agreement
ended up obliging smallholders, who already started out with
limited assets, to pay access fees to KFS for their extractive needs
while contributing to the forest protection that largely benefited
larger farmers and conservancy owners. The resulting
institutional structure of the CFA thereby further undermined
their agency-based empowerment, with respect to their ability to
take control over their lives and secure better livelihoods (Alkire
2005, Cleaver 2005). These dynamics, whereby social and
economically differentiated groups compete for environmental
goods and services, and one group acts to limit access of the other,
have been repeatedly observed elsewhere (Nygren 2000, Saito-
Jensen et al. 2010).  
In relation to the wider debate on empowerment, our study is also
consistent with previous authors who have shown that the
processes of local empowerment through CBFM are usually
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neither effective nor well achieved in practice (Agrawal and
Gibson 1999, Poteete and Ribot 2011). There are several
explanations generally advanced for this. At a policy level,
legislative frameworks governing the introduction of CBFM are
often faulted, as in our case, for allocating insufficient powers to
local communities (Ribot et al. 2006, Agrawal and Ostrom 2008).
Policies have also been criticized for appearing to apply double
standards, in maximizing profit extraction through strict
oversight by the state, while claiming to be propoor (Oyono 2004,
Larson and Ribot 2007). Policies are also seen as blind to the
diverse and dynamic local context within which they are applied,
ultimately falling short of achieving the goal of local
empowerment.  
In other cases, as in Ngare Ndare, powerful actors use various
means to attenuate the process of local empowerment, despite the
existence of potentially empowering policies. These behaviours
can be classified as economic, political, discursive, coercive, or
symbolic (Poteete and Ribot 2011). In our case, economic and
symbolic forms of power were wielded by larger scale farmers and
conservancy owners, who not only controlled the CFA, but were
also major players in other local development initiatives,
including provision of health and education services to the local
community. In this case, if  the poorer group challenged power
structures, they might have to face opportunity costs of acting
against the interests of the elites. These power imbalances may
hold back poorer groups from holding the CFA accountable, for
fear of social and economic repercussions, thereby reinforcing
their position of disempowerment (Cleaver 2005). This reduces
the overall ability of smallholders to negotiate, influence, control,
and hold institutions accountable (Narayan 2005). Although
some scholars have shown how institutional forms of
empowerment, including representation and the ability to hold
leaders accountable, are undermined by elite capture (Saito-
Jensen et al. 2010), others have looked at the positive side. They
show that elites may provide resources, networks, and knowledge
that can be useful for supporting local development (Olowu 2003),
and that elite capture is not always a permanent outcome because
formalized structures under CBFM may expose domination by
elites, which might then be challenged by marginalized groups
(Saito-Jensen et al. 2010).
CONCLUSION
Our research shows that although CBFM policies may contain
bold statements about local empowerment, in practice, they may
easily fall short of achieving it. In Ngare Ndare, we attribute this
to insufficient and unbalanced transfer of powers to local
institutions, coupled with elite capture and structural biases
produced over time. The state transferred responsibility for
enforcing rules but not powers to make them, or the revenue from
their implementation, and did not ensure local institutional
structures that allowed the majority of smallholder farmers to
exercise agency. State actors, including the Kenya Forest Service,
retained legislating and regulating access and use of forest
products. Economic benefits, including fees charged for accessing
forest products, were also largely retained by KFS, while CFAs
only received revenue from eco-tourism. For CBFM institutions
to contribute to local empowerment, governments and their
agencies must devolve rule-making powers, so that CFAs have
decision-making powers and economic benefits commensurate
with their responsibility for forest protection. This would conform
to the principles of subsidiarity, where actors with responsibility
for implementing forest rules are also enabled to make decisions
about forest utilization, protection, and revenue.  
When more powers are transferred, measures to ensure equitable
representation in the local institutions exercising these powers
become more important. Particular measures may be required to
ensure that disadvantaged groups can exercise sufficient agency
within the institutional structures that are set up. This requires
going beyond a focus on descriptive representation, in terms of
prescribing numbers of elected leaders from various groups, to
ensuring substantive representation, in terms of responsiveness
of institutions to a diverse set of constituents, with differing and
sometimes conflicting needs and interests. Careful considerations
should be made in crafting institutions that ultimately empower
the socially and economically marginalized groups and
circumvent elite capture. Election of a majority of local leaders
does not seem to eliminate elite capture because elites have the
resources and social capital to get elected, or assume appointed
positions from where they can exert great influence. Whereas
CBFM by itself  cannot easily address larger socioeconomic
structures that create and sustain elites, governments can address
inequity and poverty, created by heavily skewed distributions of
land ownership and wealth. CBFM could contribute to
addressing these issues if  formalized rules were drawn up
regarding equity in distribution of forest benefits.  
More comprehensive valuation of forest benefits, including
ecosystem services such as water, wildlife habitat, and eco-
tourism, should be taken into account in making rules on charging
fees and benefit sharing, so that the beneficiaries of these
ecosystem services share responsibility for forest protection along
with those beneficiaries who rely on firewood collection and
grazing. In that way, the large-scale farmers and conservancy
owners, might realize that, apart from wanting to control CFAs
to further their own interests, they share a burden of responsibility
for ensuring benefits accrue to the larger number of poorer
smallholders. Awareness of these challenges to achieving
empowerment should foster design of more appropriate
decentralization policies and practice guidelines and prompt
governments to act on inequalities and poverty that stifle agency
of marginalized groups, together with putting measures in place
to make it more difficult for elites to capture local institutions to
which power is devolved.  
__________  
[1] These refer to public forests, which although are said to be
managed by the state on behalf  of the public, essentially means
they would fall under state ownership (see Agrawal et al. 2008 on
governance of world’s forests).
[2] The “Nyayo tea zones” was a World Bank funded project in the
1980s that aimed at creating 100 m buffer zones around forests
where tea was planted as a “simple but effective way” of stopping
people from encroaching government forests. This turned out into
a major loss of forests and protracted ownership of the tea zones,
which were grabbed by former president Moi, and his cronies
(Klopp 2012).
[3] KI and, later in the text, SSI numbers have replaced names of
interview respondents. Focus group discussions are also labeled
with numbers to enable tracing the origin of data sources.
[4] The CFA/Trust did not start collecting revenue until 2010 after
KFS signed the management agreement and the CFA put up its
human and technical infrastructure (including employing
technical staff) together.
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